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Abstract 
Recent linguistic research on humour and conversation has been successfully achieved on 
pragmatic and sociolinguistic grounds. My contribution should try to follow this 
(bi)methodological trail, deepening on the study of conversation and its implications. I 
should call Contextual Contamination (CC) the procedure of linking together different 
arguments and scripts in spontaneous talk. CC not only would follow from the well known 
given-new information opposition in talk, but would trigger comical sequencing and 
colloquial thinking aswell. My second step would undertake Douglas (1975a; 1975b) 
analysis on situational coherence in humour. I will approach some issues about mock attack 
theory and the collapse of pressuposed script in practical situations. My last point will 
approach the narrative constituent of comical performance. Absurd narratives (non 
comical) also confront the notional order embedded in natural stories, and we would try to 
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grasp how this contrast works. My conclusions will draw together the narrative and the 
conversational dimensions of humour. 
 
Keywords: Conversation analysis, narrativity, ethnography, hermeneutics. 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatics and sociolinguistics 
Recent research on humour in pragmatics and sociolinguistics is sufficiently rich and 
diverse. The eclosion and later adoption of formal models to analyse humour (Attardo 
1994) have focalized most discussions and opened paths for work that has followed. More 
concretely, the heuristic use of the interpretive model developed by Attardo & Raskin 
(1991) could and should be of special interest to educational work, and many workshops in 
different contexts move in this applied and multidisciplinary direction. Alongside the more 
formal models, we should also have in mind the development of applied functional research 
such as that carried out by Holmes (2000) on humour at workplaces, or by Kothoff (2003) 
on irony and language registers, amongst others (Cf. Attardo 2003). These approaches are 
all based on conversational data which have been obtained directly, and they present 
analysis and evidence with a considerable degree of formal precision. The sociological 
distinction made by Holmes between positive and critical humour, besides dating back to 
the long-established sociolinguistic separation between solidarity and power, can be 
explored in different empirical settings. Kothoff’s attention towards what is meant, leads 
her to the discovery of two orientations in response to irony: one leaning towards what has 
been said (de dicto interpretation), and another towards the implications (or de re 
interpretation), with differing argumentative consequences. These works highlight the 
interactions between conversation and cognition –and also social cognition. To the 
discourse analist and the sociolinguist, they emphasise the fact that empirical data belong to 
the building of interpretation. Here I argue that we should connect these broad 
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methodological commitments in order to make headway in sociolinguistic and pragmatic 
research on humour. 
My paper will explore issues related to ordinary conversation and its narrative 
implications. I will follow the inspiration of Norrick’s work (1993; 2000) and also, to some 
extent, Attardo’s (2001) general consideration of the essentially narrative nature of humour. 
Norrick has insisted in the value of conversational practice in the construction of humour. 
The storylike, performative side of comicity reveals the role of thematic  reorientations, of 
metalinguistic resources, of restarting, false endings and lopped stories. Here, puns are not 
only verbal constructions, but also part of the argumentative plot in the dialogue, part of 
what speakers are willing to accept as conversationally feasible or not. Conversation is not 
only a set of logical arrangements, which it also is, but an interactive event that includes 
slips, reorganisation, breaks and summaries. I consider that Norrick’s combination of 
ethnography and hermeneutics is an excellent path to follow, one that deserves closer 
attention.  
 
Contextual Contamination 
In The Act of Creation, Arthur Koestler (1964) proposed a way to analyse comical 
sequences centred around the idea of bisociation. Bisociation resonates in different ways in 
human cognitive organisation, in the emotional system, in strict logic and in interaction 
through pranks and jokes. Although bisociation has been satisfyingly and formally 
developed in pragmatics through Script Theory (Cf. Attardo 1994), I would like 
conversation analysis to embrace Koestler’s multiple echoes, regarding situational plots, 
emotions and verbal translation, so present in spontaneous conversational material (Viana 
2004). We should recall Koestler’s inspirational sentence: 
It takes time to talk a person out of a mood, however valid the arguments; passion is 
blind to better judgement; anger and fear show physical after-effects long after their 
causes have been removed. If we could change our moods as quickly as we jump 
from one thought to another we would be acrobats of emotion. (Koestler 1964:57) 
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We can follow these acrobatics of emotion through ordinary conversation. First of 
all, I would like to inquiry into what we could call contextual contamination, the capacity 
to shift from one context to another (from one script to another), in the course of everyday 
interaction.  We have a pretty clear idea of how we perform this transfer by alternating 
given and new. Thematic progression does not work in a linear way: we achieve a certain 
conversational coherence by means of informative zig-zagging. This alternation between 
given and new allows us to perceive how new contexts enter frames that we take for 
granted, and it is this breach that is of interest. Contextual contamination is always an open 
possibility, in spontaneous conversation, owing to the productive mechanism of interaction 
itself. I take contextual contamination to be the meaningful penetration of contexts in such 
a way that it is difficult to pinpoint the salient frame at a given conversational point –
without leading to difficulties in processing. 
Two different and well-known authors have commented on this basic intuition: G. 
K. Chesterton and Ervin Goffman. Chesterton wrote some wonderful lines about how 
delicate it is to lose the thread of the conversation. He commented upon the perils of 
changing the orientation of the conversation or of it seeming to change direction towards a 
known topic which may be irrelevant to the speakers. What interested him was how it was 
possible that an improvised conversation could lead somewhere else, somewhere 
completely different from its departure point. This is what fascinated him and what, 
according to him, made conversation seriously relevant –specially ordinary conversation. 
The fragment I am referring to belongs to The Paradoxes of Mr. Pond and takes place 
amidst a collective logical deduction. Chesterton introduces the subject of resuming a 
conversation as part of a search for clues on which the participants are deliberating: 
"But if the conversation's not worth starting again, why is it horrible to stop it?" 
asked the conscientious Wotton, still laboriously in pursuit. 
"Why, that's why it's horrible to stop it," answered Pond, almost snappishly for so 
polite a person. "Talk ought to be sacred because it is so light, so tenuous, so 
trivial, if you will; anyhow, so frail and easy to destroy. Cutting short its life is 
worse than murder; it's infanticide (...) A good light conversation can never be put 
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together again when it's broken to pieces; because you can't get all the pieces. 
 (Chesterton 1937)  
In fact, the most open-minded observations related to the given vs. new can be 
found in Goffman’s study Forms of Talk (1981). Goffman comes across as specially 
sensitive to diversions from conversation: the fact that the same departure sentence could 
originate so many variations, even hardly changing the situation –the contextual settings. 
He delighted in imagining different answers to the same conventional question (“Did you 
enjoy the film yesterday, love?”) and explored which contextual settings seemed to be 
available depending on each answer. 
We could call these conversational opportunities, these improvised reorientations, 
fissures. But it is certainly a more systematic occurrence. I am in favour of filling the 
situation of contextual contamination (CC) with content, understood as the the procedure of 
linking together different arguments and scripts in spontaneous talk. CC would be 
responsible not only for the given vs. new information opposition in talk, but also for 
comical sequencing and colloquial thinking in general; in a way, it would be used as a 
creative tool in dialogue. 
Through the contrast between anecdotes and stories, we reach a different analytical 
level. By definition, anecdote is trivial, a parallel story to what we are really narrating, so as 
to say. We keep the thread with the stories, we cook up the plot, we await the denouement. 
The anecdote may not lead anywhere, but it has a value of its own. Now: in ordinary 
conversation, anecdotes generate stories. Like cherries: when you pull one of the stems, you 
can end up with a whole bunch. The explanation I would like to draw from here is that in 
thematic progression two classifications are activated: hierarchical or treelike, and 
connective or netlike classifications. Far from the traditional opposition, conversation links 
them to assure continuity. Hierarchical order secures the logic of a story according to basic 
narrative principles. Network ordering does none of this: it works through contact, freeing 
the wagons from the track. It unchains rather that chains. Somehow, it launches other 
stories, but is not responsible of narrating them. Indeed, being the junction (or the 
disjunction), it is as relevant as the sequence of the story. When we speak, we do two things 
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at the same time: pay attention to the order of the discourse and wander off to link topics. 
We relate topics taking trivial incidents as starting points: a marginal observation, a date, or 
a complementary explanation. We temporarily suspend narrative logic to link the next 
exchange. This general development can be examined with absolute precision in ordinary 
conversation, showing when it becomes more articulate and when it soars, giving way to a 
creative discourse that is also coherent.  
 
Coherence in humour 
Taking all the previous into consideration, my next step takes me to Douglas’ analysis 
(1975a; 1975b; 1996) and her mock attack thesis. One of the purposes of my paper is to 
explore the coherence between lived situations, conversational narratives and joke patterns. 
We can take ethnography as a starting point with Mary Douglas, for, as I see it, the British 
anthropologist developed a new and extremely interesting argument  based on situational 
value. 
But, first, the mock attack thesis. The most well-known theories of the great 20th 
century authors laid the foundations to understand the structure of a comical situation: the 
appearance of prominent meanings produced by an unconscious set of topics (sex, 
aggression, scatology), the background-foreground contrast between the mechanic and the 
organic, or bisociation as a creative instrument. Mary Douglas tryied to synthesise Freud’s 
and Bergson’s best work in a discerning sentence: Humour is a play on form. She kept 
Koestler’s inspiration that paralleled humour with agression and conveniently transformed 
it into a mock attack, thus changing this idea into an interpretative instrument to discover 
humour in situations. This is where I believe lies an interesting turning point. 
Douglas does not interpret mock attack in terms of aggression and violence, but of 
play (keeping in mind that there is agressive as well as non-agressive humour). The crucial 
issue is directly related to the key moment when we joke: it lies in the suspension of the 
attack. Her formula goes this way:  Needless to say, a successful subversion of one form by 
another completes or ends the joke, for it changes the balance of power (Douglas 1975b: 
96). At the very moment when the play on form becomes evident, the joke ends; the 
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denouement is the manifestation of the playful subversion. We cannot add anything 
because we would spoil it. This dissolution when faced with playful subversion is 
fundamental in the construction of a joke. Such an approach to the final sequence links 
specially well with what we know about the formal structure of verbal humour (and the 
punch line). It also tells us something about the pragmatic content of what is implicit  (and 
what we call the script opposition) and the moment when the joke ends. 
But this is only part of the question. Douglas’ analysis enables us to go further, for it 
gives us elements to know under which circumstances we can mould or insert a joke with 
some success. A joke is an event that happens, that someone produces in the course of 
action. Therefore, we can tackle it only in pragmatic terms. Let’s think of real situations in 
which we can burst out laughing: Douglas (1996) argues that, to accept a joke, we must 
understand that the situation matches a possible inversion. The idea is that an attack on 
form is a kind of inversion. It will suffice for the time being to bear in mind that a situation 
should be perceived as being flexible enough to receive an alternative interpretation. This 
match between the situation as it is perceived and the joke as it is given or received is 
important: a joke will not work if the situation is too rigid and does not tolerate inversions 
or if the joke cannot match the inversion with an appropriate context. In Douglas’ words: 
I once argued that the social situation provides the context for seeing a joke. I 
claimed that the social context gives licence for the laugh: if the context is wrong, 
the same event will just not be funny. For recognizing “the right context” I took the 
old idea that a joke has the structure of an inversion, I added the idea that the 
inversions can be read as an analogy of the social situation, and added one more 
principle: that if the social structure is of a kind in which reversal is thinkable, then 
the latent joke is licensed and everyone can laugh; but is the social situation is tense 
with anxiety and fear, any expression of reversal is too dangerous, and the latent 
joke will be reversed. I still believe that social awareness flips the joke into and out 
of the danger areas.   (Douglas 1996: 5-6) 
This implicit appeal to coherence is interesting because it enables us to do away 
with possible structural inversions that are not comical and, contrariwise, to detect potential 
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humour that has not obtained its explicit resolution. Douglas is very precise in her thesis of 
matching the situation as it is perceived and the kind of subversion that is introduced. On 
the whole, it is an excellent guide for an ethnographic analysis. The thesis claims 
sociolinguistic coherence at two levels, between the structure of the joke and the lived 
situation –in fact, at four levels, if we add the psychological domain, also double, with the 
bodily, corporeal response (laughter), and the logical trigger, the incongruity (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Fourfolded coherence 
Joke structure Lived situation SL level 
Logical trigger Corporeal response PSY level 
 
We will move into ambiguity to show the extension of Douglas’ argumentation and 
to link it with the third part of this paper: the value of the narration. I will transcribe a story 
from an informant [EB] about her visit to a bookshop, which contains interesting elements 
for us to delve into the notion of situational coherence. Some words about the context are 
needed: the reader should keep in mind that in 2005 the Hispanic world was celebrating the 
IV Centenary of the publication of Don Quixote. Besides important ritual events, this has 
generated many jokes, visual and verbal, which have certainly brightened the event. What 
my informant heard at one bookshop in Lleida (Catalonia, Spain) is not exactly a comical 
story, but it would have the ethnographic value of a real situation, recorded and susceptible 
to being compared to other canned jokes. Her story is as follows: 
I was in this bookshop a few days before Christmas, amidst the usual Christmas 
rush. A lady in her mid-thirties walked in –she clearly came from a modest 
background, you could see by her clothes and her way of speaking. She had a book 
wrapped in paper under her arm, she went up to one of the shop assistants and said: 
“Here I am again – after all the time I was here the other day it was of no use...”. 
She unwrapped the book carefully and I can see it’s a good edition of Don Quixote, 
leather bound, brown, with some golden thread even. The shop assistant asked her: 
“What’s wrong? Didn’t your husband like the book?”. “Well, I thought he’d like it 
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because it’s on TV so much... he said it was OK, but that he prefers another one.” 
The shop assistant asked which one he wanted, and the lady had it written on a 
piece of paper; she looked at it and in a small voice she said: “He says it’s called 
Kamasutra.“ The shop assistant exclaimed in surprise, but but went on: “This way. 
We have it over here. There are many editions.” They took some time to choose one 
of them and they walked back to the till. “I hope he likes it this time... It’s got lots of 
pictures...”, the shop assistant said, adding: “If there’s anything at all, just come 
back; don’t worry: that’s what we’re here for!”.   
[EB, personal communication, 22.12.04] 
As I have said, I cannot assume this is a comical story exactly. The formal elements 
of bisociation are here, the culture script vs. the sex script, with all the underlying meanings 
we are aware of. The key moment of the situation, when the client unfolds the paper with 
the other book’s name, enough intrigue to guess whether she knows which book her 
husband has asked for and the presupposed knowledge about Don Quixote that one expects 
the Hispanic audience to possess –all this is here. The story, like all comical stories, can be 
explained according to different sociocultural implications: the importance of reading, the 
role of shop assistants, the value of illustrations in books, the influence of propaganda and 
publicity, and so on. In none of these aspects is EB’s story necessarily comical. What seems 
to be clear here, however, is that it is at least a potentially comical situation that, in a first 
stage, does not result in a comical outcome because it does not match any possible 
inversion: participants, or even the narrator, don’t look for any explicit alternative way to 
look at things, to make things evolve in a different manner. 
Examining real situations has this advantage: that we come across definite cases that 
challenge the coherence set. We know we can have laughter withour comicity in ordinary 
situations; now we have potential comicity without practical resolution. What could 
surprise us most about EB’s story after having heard it, and after having let it wander 
around our minds, is the contamination of scripts it establishes, following the line of 
contamination by contextual analogy in ordinary conversation. Now we have sufficient 
elements to relate Don Quixote, the funniest romance of chivalry in the world, with the 
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Kamasutra, the Indian collection of advices and postures. One thread can lead us to 
another. The explained anecdote fulfills this function: like conversational analogies, the 
narration about the real life situation in the bookshop somehow links both scripts. 
My informant delivered the lived situation in the narrative form. Unfortunately, her 
story does not make use of sufficient conversational cues to help us take the story too 
comically. We would have to know how to modify the narration so that it could become 
comical (or more comical), because this transformation is crucial to what is relevant here. 
This is what we often do with the narration of anecdotes and the introduction of the 
comical-like in conversation: we display a whole array of conversational cues, we modify 
the narratives appropriately for them to be funny, or we introduce them into flexible 
contexts (with interventions from others, or digressions) with the same purpose. 
My thesis is that, in conversation, and in humourous narration, contextualization 
plays the role of the correspondence between joke and situation mentioned by Douglas. 
Jokes and humourous stories are carried out among people and demand the participants’ 
complicity. The speakers lay out the cues of the humourous narrative so that the listeners 
can develop its comical interpretation. The narrators force their voices, make loud noises, 
shout, they then distance themselves to get to grips with the story, and, finally, deliberately, 
deliver the punch-line. These pragmatic transformations, so well presented by Neal R. 
Norrick (1993), facilitate a multiple processing of information, help to open lexemes to 
parallel and sometimes incompatible meanings and call for the listener (and the speaker) to 
take into account two scripts at least when interpreting the story. This is how lived 
situations can become comical anecdotes. Continuitiy goes along with correspondence. 
What is coherent in the joke –the play on the situation through a verbal support– and what 
is coherent in the comical situation –the inversion of an expected situation– links with what 
is coherent in the most open comical narrative strategy: the contextual cues that draw 
attention to the multiple interpretations. 
Canned jokes seem to be the most elaborate version possible of verbal humour 
(constituting a text in themselves, closed), whereas spontaneous joking, which require a 
flexible situation to be admitted and matched, would represent the most unexpected version 
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of the ethnographic situation. In this line, verbal jokes would not be pure invention, but 
would become closer to the anecdotes we come across in real life situations. Mid-way, we 
would have narrative manoeuvre and conversational strategies that enable the narration of 
anecdotes, which we have just referred to.  
This supposed continuity allows us to accept as meaningful the situations in which 
the jokes are told. Much can be said here: the way in which a joke is related to the rest of 
the situational events is suggestive and interesting. One of the oldest jokes in the world: 
“Doctor, it hurts when I get up”, “Well, get up later...” can appear, –or be transformed, or 
introduced partially as a joke, unconsciously– in different ways, according to different 
things: doctor jokes, wishing to stay in bed, the uncomprehending world, or the speed of 
diagnosis. Any of these associations is informative and suggests others things at the same 
time (including the possibility that the joke is a failure). It is highly probable that the 
canonical distinction between anecdotes and jokes, besides purporting a further level of 
formal precision, holds in latent form the relative degree of a connection with the context, 
given that anecdotes (understood now as brief conversational narrations) can be recuperated 
and play a clear memoristic role in human conversation and cognition; and jokes, precisely, 
unconnected with context and exportable, work as a machine to induce forgetfulness, or 
dissociate concepts –as Douglas says about ritual humour: they connect widely differing 
fields, but the connection destroys hierarchy and order (Douglas 1975b:102). Let us take it 
also as referring to conceptual grounds. 
All these points depend on the initial formula: a joke has to present an inversion that 
matches a flexible situation that the participants are willing to subvert (= to play upon). In 
this way, the reverse situation is also possible: that an overtly subversive situation should 
claim a joke. The proximity of a very tall and thin person, and a short and fat one almost 
demands its comical expression. And this is just on physical resemblance. The path is open 
to explore what we could call latent jokes, the kind of comical situations that only require 
to be perceived by someone and expressed in order to surface. This heuristic value, which 
can be assimilated to formal theories, seems interesting and, in any case, makes the 
exploration of ethnographic situations possible . 
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Underpinning Narrative 
The intuitive notion of conversation, inasmuch as it is a collaborative task (and somewhat 
improvised) does not help think of its narrative constraints. However, a couple of excellent 
works help us think in this direction: Chafe (1994) and Norrick (2000). Probably, one way 
of looking at the subject is to concentrate on the empirical construction of plots and 
understand narrative as being close to the translation of experience. I would like to think of 
the comical genre as inserted in this domain. Attardo (2001) has provided us with sufficient 
arguments to evaluate the basic narrative structure of jokes, the most clearly marked textual 
genre.  
Logical narrative patterns are based on temporality and thematic progression. For 
classical rhetorics and poetics, the narrative pattern evokes the unfolding of human life: 
birth, growth, development (maturity, diversification) and end. Around this pattern appear 
all the known branches: kinds of actions and events, characters, situations, and the 
corresponding sequencing, with the unexpected contingencies and coincidences. Seymour 
Chatman (1978) took this classical pattern as a starting point to examine the difference 
between story and discourse with which we develop the plot. 
The logical pattern is described as containing a centre and a periphery. What is 
essential in the narrative pattern, with all possible variations, is the idea of the plot and the 
climax. Before the climax and preparing the plot, there can be diverse presentations and 
introductions. The tenor of these presentations, and their existence, is peripherical material. 
We understand that the main part is the plot. At the same time, the climax and plots demand 
or include some kind of denouement, of outcome. Strictly speaking, the denouement is as 
necessary as the plot. It does not belong exactly to the periphery; it is simply the 
compensation required by the plot and the trajectories. Perceptively, however, the 
denouement belongs to the periphery in the measure that it triggers the ending. For the sake 
of convenience, we can agree that the ending is peripheric and that it includes the outcome 
of the plot. The tenor of the endings and their probable extension –through epilogues and 
glosses– can be (and has been) highly variable. 
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Literally, a denouement brings order to the confusion created by the plot. All plots 
must end in one way or another just as they have to start somewhere: this is one of the 
conditions of the pattern, which tolerates recursivity well, allows second and third parts. 
One of the old words to designate the denouement is catastrophe. If we situate ourselves in 
a tragic plot, the catastrophe is not, precisely, the return to early normality, but the moment 
when all problems and tensions emerge. This is still close to our idea of denouement, 
inasmuch as catastrophe is demanded by the plot. That the catastrophe coincides with the 
end is one of the possibilities. We have said that the endings can extend more or less 
significatively to include epilogues and even moral reflections. All this coincides perfectly 
with the interests of rhetorics and poetics –and is, strictly speaking, pure discursive syntax. 
Let us now consider humourous narrative. We have agreed that humour, at least in 
the most elaborate forms of the joke, in parallel with other discursive kinds of organisation, 
presents a basic narrative pattern. The idea of the denouement now takes on another 
dimension. Comical narrative also contains a preparation –or not– and needs to soar with 
the plot, but other things happens afterwards. My thesis, in accordance with what I have 
been arguing about the coherence between levels of experience and verbal levels, is that 
here we have a serious inversion of the narrative pattern, a play upon logical structure. In 
verbal and practical jokes, as well as in comical situations that we interpret according to a 
narrative pattern, things happen the other way around: in the first place, the plot is 
subordinated to the denouement. In the second place, the denouement involves a new link, 
a kind of odd plot. Thirdly, the first two conditions compel us (in different degrees) to a 
backward reading of the narration, without which no humour is possible. 
It is fascinating to observe the narrative structure, on the one hand, and its powerful 
dissolution, on the other. Inverse, implicit, reading complicates things. In comical narrative, 
the denouement (wrongly called “denouement” here) is a break and, at the same time, a 
new plot –in fact, the plot to be grasped if it is a comical narration. We notice that a plot at 
the end is logical nonsense. It’s a plot that breaks the narrative, a complication with no 
development. In itself, comical narration is an attack against narrative form. Here, the end 
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is the beginning. To indicate more paradoxically that it is the beginning, there can be 
nothing after the punch line, which represents the absortion of the end.  
It is coherent to find equivalences between the way in which we take situations and 
how we organise meanings. In the hypothesis I am arguing for here, formal inversion also 
affects the narrative interpretation of comical situations. Jokes do precisely this by means 
of a verbally ordered discourse: we recognise narrative entries, we wait patiently while the 
plot advances, knowing it will end up as a soft and empty husk (this itself is funny, the plot 
has lost value), and, finally, the punch line propels us towards an unexpected and silent 
version of the story. When we perceive a comical situation, we will apply a similar pattern. 
We walk into an office, for example, and a certain distribution of tables and people 
surprises us. On closer examination, we discover that the tables have been distributed as if 
they were a fort to defend a person. So, the reading fort-defence overrides that of tables-
office and we cannot help laughing. In this pattern, the end of the story is also a 
complication of the initial story. In classical terms, the contrast between congruence and 
incongruence (a relative one, because there can be also partial resolution) indicates the 
comical perception, the contrary of what is canonically produced in the perception of 
standard stories. 
I do not know whether there is a word that means catastrophe in a comical sense. 
Contrarily, we possess a certain knowledge concerning sudden beginnings: to start in 
medias res means exactly this and has been, undoubtedly, relevant in narratives, both 
rhetorically and poetically. It could also represent the logical correlation of our comical 
endings. We know we can start suddenly, intuition tells us that to start in medias res 
presupposes the ternary structure of beginning, climax, denouement”, and we know that we 
will rebuild the logical order afterwards somehow. But, on the other extreme, we have not 
completely identified these broken endings that press towards an implicit script that 
destroys the certainty of the told story. As we know, the symmetries and chiasms of our 
cognitive systems are neither perceived as being stable nor find regular translations into 
vocabulary (Cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986). Symetrically, we should say, in Latin, nihil in 
fine, only the story that bursts, in whichever way (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Narrative structure and marked spots 
Plot Denouement Ending 
in medias res catastrophe nihil in fine 
 
Let’s move one step further. We can discern fairly well incomplete stories from 
these comical regenerative endings. The inverted pattern of humour offers a logical way to 
introduce what is absurd into the narrative, to integrate it in a schema, in a genre. Without 
these rigourous rules about inversion and the end, incomplete narratives would purport an 
absurd air, nonsensical, far from strict comical (in)coherence. Incomplete stories, so usual 
in any kind of conversational narrative, enable us to navigate along this indefinite area that 
touches upon absurdity because it defies patterns and completness. The quantity of stories 
that get lost on the way in everyday conversational practice suggests our need to impose 
and look for patterns in interpretation. Indeed, ordinary conversation, as Chesterton and 
Goffmann perceived, contains potentially infinite paths difficult to follow a posteriori; it is 
made of digressions, of lost threads and half drafted stories. It is the layer where different 
style manouevres repose. To the conversational analyst, all this has meaning, it is part of an 
activity in progression. 
Obviously, it is possible to attain absurdity through a well organised literary piece, 
although it may be a delicate and difficult topic. Samuel Beckett’s narrative is probably the 
most stimulating example. For the sake of our argument, let us consider The Unnamable. 
This is a work of creative disorder, of elaborate verbal machinery to produce distorsion. At 
least a few lines will remind us of his intention: 
(1) At no moment do I know what I'm talking about, nor of whom, nor of where, nor 
how, nor why. But I could employ fifty wretches for this sinister operation and still 
be short of a fifty-first, to close the circuit - that I know (without knowing what it 
means).  
(2) They build up hypotheses that collapse on top of one another (it's human, a 
lobster couldn't do it). 
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 (3) This story is no good, I'm beginning almost to believe it. 
(Beckett 1953) 
Hypothesis that collapse on top of one another: a good definition of a narrative that 
defies a logical pattern, a narrative that claims to have no end. In general, in The 
Unnamable and other works, Beckett’s decided insistence in not finishing, in continuing 
with the discourse, is already his first general impugnation of the cognitive premises of 
narrativity. All discourse is always a part of, and the pretension of infinitude, declared, 
open, goes against it. The Unnamable is peppered with lost references, false endings, with 
sudden appearances of the characters, with disappearances and improvised reappearances. 
The interesting question is that the predominant texture dissuades from seeking any 
meaningful organisation. And if it is all about building stories, Beckett manages to build 
and demolish all the cognitive system at the same time. The following, somewhat long, 
fragment will illustrate the procedure of building a story and discredit it perfectly: 
They love each other, marry (in order to love each other better, more conveniently). 
He goes to the wars, he dies at the wars. She weeps (with emotion) at having loved 
him, at having lost him. (Yep!) Marries again (in order to love again, more 
conveniently again). They love each other. (You love as many times as necessary - 
as necessary in order to be happy.) He come back (the other comes back) from the 
wars: he didn't die at the wars after all. She goes to the station, to meet him. He dies 
in the train (of emotion) at the thought of seeing her again, having her again. She 
weeps (weeps again, with emotion again) at having lost him again. (Yep!) Goes 
back to the house. He's dead - the other is dead. The mother-in-law takes him down: 
he hanged himself (with emotion) at the thought of losing her. She weeps (weeps 
louder) at having loved him, at having lost him. 
There's a story for you! That was to teach me the nature of emotion (that's called 
emotion): what emotion can do (given favourable conditions), what love can do. 
(Well well! So that's emotion! That's love!) And trains, the nature of trains. And the 
meaning of your back to the engine, and guards, stations, platforms, wars, love, 
heart-rending cries. (That must be the mother-in-law: her cries rend the heart as 
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she takes down her son. Or her son-in-law? I don't know. It must be her son, since 
she cries.) And the door? The house-door is bolted: when she got back from the 
station she found the house-door bolted. Who bolted it? He the better to hang 
himself? Or the mother-in-law the better to take him down? Or to prevent her 
daughter-in-law from re-entering the premises? There's a story for you! (It must be 
the daughter-in-law: it isn't the son-in-law and the daughter, it's the daughter-in-
law and the son. How I reason to be sure this evening!) It was to teach me how to 
reason, it was to tempt me to go, to the place where you can come to an end. 
 (Beckett 1953) 
There is nothing particularly humorous here, because the demolition exercice takes 
precedence, along Beckett’s effort on cognitive distrust. What we have here is a precise 
literary verbal display against narrative order. The unending pattern claimed by the Irish 
writer corresponds, in a literary level, to unfineshed stories in ordinary conversation –and 
still contrasts with the inverted pattern we have recognised in comical narratives. Absurdity 
is related to lost threads as well as comicity is linked to sudden opposite plots. The quality 
and the revision of the end is implied in both cases. 
Beckett, who wished to conduct his writing towards the negation of any system, also 
had to mock the humouristic pattern, establish a distance from laughter, so it could be a 
good idea, in his delicate work of digressions and unendings, to let fragments of an odd 
order, remains of comical narrative, surface from time to time. This comical outbursts allow 
us to put absurdity in the narrative spotlight momentarily, so the reader can admire it, but 
we soon return to the serious side of an unending discourse that is seldom congruent, 
something like the face of that friend who never laughs at jokes. We do not know what is 
going on in his or her head, but we guess that he or she must be lost in one of these possible 
narrative mazes. The Unnamable lives on in this region of lost steps. This is its basic 
narrative choice.  
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Terminus 
In this paper, I have tried to deep on the conversational analysis of humour and its 
implications, from the point of view of ethnography, pragmatics and narrativity. I think that 
the establishment of connections between narrative and conversational models is 
interesting. After all, comical narrative often closes with a dialogue (in canned humour), 
and comical dialogue is one of the paths towards narrative openness (in conversational 
humour), so that the collusion of both perspectives is fairly pertinent. As I said at the 
beginning, an appropriate combination of ethnography and hermeneutics is also of use 
(Fludernik 1996). 
 I have worked along the coherence on different levels: situational, verbal and 
pragmatic, trying to understand their common concern with contextual contact and 
inversion. I have tried to clarify the narrative roots of humorous activity, and related to this, 
I have brought forward the definition of comic ending, in front of other rhetorical patterns: 
then I have found meaningful contrasts to different models of narrative disruption, like 
ordinary conversational telling, and literary experiments on cognitive distorsion (as 
Beckett’s The Unnamable). Finally, I have suggested that the basic narrative sign, from a 
cognitive point of view, comprises fragmentation (and boundaries). Jokes follow strictly 
these narrative premises, introducing a logical way to alter the end. 
 
 
 
Note 
The author would like to thank Maria González from the Universitat de Vic (Catalonia, 
Spain) for her translation into English of this paper, and to Salvatore Attardo for a kind 
reading of a previous version of it (and the fresh discussion that followed). A short version 
of this work was presented in a plenary session of the 17th International Conference of 
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here can be found in Viana (2004). 
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